Notices

Atty. No. 12775

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION

PENELOPE BAIM BLOCK; VANDANA MAKKER; BALA M. KRISHNA; TY C. GEARHARDT; BRIJ M. SHARMA; CHARANJIT SINGH; LISA M. BERTINI; JEFFREY I. ZIMMERMAN, MUKESH MITTAL; SANJAY AGARWAL; and SAVITA REDDY,

Plaintiffs,    

v. 

MCDONALD’S CORPORATION,

Defendant.

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT -- CLASS ACTION

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Penelope Baim Block, Vandana Makker, Bala M. Krishna, Ty C. Gearhardt, Brij M. Sharma, Charanjit Singh, Lisa M. Bertini, Jeffrey I. Zimmerman, Mukesh Mittal, Sanjay Agarwal and Savita Reddy, by and through their undersigned attorneys, bring this action to secure redress from deceptive practices in the sale of french fries and hash browns by defendant McDonald’s Corporation and its franchisees. Between July 1990 and approximately May 24, 2001, defendant and its agents represented in widespread advertising campaigns, press releases, on McDonald’s Internet website and in McDonald’s restaurants that McDonald’s french fries and hash browns are cooked only in vegetable oil. In fact, defendant cooked french fries and hash browns using beef tallow or beef extract. During that period defendant did not disclose to consumers that McDonald’s french fries and hash browns contained beef tallow or beef extract, a fact highly material to persons such as the plaintiffs who have ethical, religious and moral objections to the consumption of animal-flesh or beef products.

PARTIES

Plaintiffs

Plaintiff Penelope Baim Block is a vegetarian who resides in Loma Linda, California.

Plaintiff Ty C. Gearhardt is a vegetarian who resides in California.

Plaintiff Lisa M. Bertini is a vegetarian who resides in Washington.

There are approximately 15 million vegetarians living in the United States.

Plaintiff Vandana Makker is a Hindu who resides in Oakland, California. Plaintiff Bala M. Krishna is a Hindu who resides in Livermore, California.

Plaintiff Brij M. Sharma is a Hindu who resides in Washington.

Plaintiff Charanjit Singh is a Hindu who resides in Washington.

Plaintiff Mukesh Mittal is a Hindu who resides in Texas.

Plaintiff Sanjay Agarwal is a Hindu who resides in Texas.

Plaintiff Savita Reddy is a Hindu who resides in Texas.

Hinduism is perhaps the world’s oldest religion, dating back to prehistoric times. There are nearly one million Hindus living in the United States.

Plaintiff Jeffrey I. Zimmerman maintains residences in Ventnor, New Jersey, and Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff Zimmerman has chosen not to eat red meat for the past 15 years, based on health and philosophical reasons. In addition, plaintiff Zimmerman adheres to a kosher diet, so he will not eat any non-kosher meat, and he will not eat red meat and dairy products in the same meal.

There are approximately 7 million Jews and other persons in the United States who consume kosher meat products.

Defendant

Defendant McDonald’s Corporation, is a nationally known fast food chain, with stores throughout the United States and in 120 other countries. It is a Delaware corporation headquartered at One McDonald’s Plaza, Oak Brook, Illinois. In 1999, McDonald’s U. S. sales exceeded $19 billion.

FACTS

McDonald’s Corporation operates both company-owned stores and franchise stores. Regardless of whether a store is company-owned or franchised, McDonald’s Corporation prescribes the ingredients of the food products served therein, so as to insure that a McDonald’s hamburger sold in Chicago is substantially identical to a McDonald’s hamburger sold anywhere else in the country.

All products sold by McDonald’s franchisees are provided by McDonald’s Corporation or approved distributors of McDonald’s. All McDonald’s franchisees are subject to rigorous quality control procedures designed to standardize the taste and quality of McDonald’s products around the country.

All media campaigns for McDonald’s restaurants are drafted, handled, approved and/or coordinated through McDonald’s Corporation.

Since the 1950s, a centerpiece of McDonald’s menu has been its french fries, which consists of deep fried potato strips. McDonald’s also sells hash browns.

For many years, McDonald’s has engaged in substantial advertising of french fries and hash browns, including advertising on television, radio and print media.

The average McDonald’s restaurant sells 87,600 pounds of french fries per year, for a grand total of about 1.05 billion pounds of french fries sold nationwide each year.

A significant proportion of such french fries and hash browns are consumed by vegetarians and other persons with religious, moral or ethical objections to the consumption of beef or meat, including plaintiffs and the members of the plaintiff class, who believe that such french fries and hash browns contain no beef or meat products.

The process through which McDonald’s french fries and hash browns are prepared is heavily regimented and monitored by defendant McDonald’s Corporation, and the process and procedure through which the fries are processed are standardized to ensure that the quality and flavor of the fries are identical in every McDonald’s restaurant around the country. Upon information and belief, all processors of McDonald’s french fries and hash browns are required by contract to prepare their french fries and hash browns pursuant to McDonald’s Corporation’s dictated and exclusive recipe.

On July 23, 1990, McDonald’s Corporation issued a press release announcing its decision to change its french fry recipe, stating that it would thereafter cook its french fries only in "100 percent vegetable oil." This press release was disseminated by McDonald’s Corporation throughout the State of California. As Ed Rensi, the President of McDonald’s U.S.A., stated in that press release:

In 1990, McDonald’s Corporation embarked on a national advertising campaign through which it touted its switch from a beef tallow/vegetable oil blend to "100 percent vegetable oil" to encourage consumers to eat its "healthier" french fries. The "change" in the preparation of the fries received extensive news coverage including, inter alia, articles published in the New York Times, Time magazine, the Chicago Sun Times, Atlanta Journal, Dallas Morning News, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Washington Times and USA Today.

McDonald’s use of beef tallow in its potato cooking process was well-known and had been the subject of public criticism. An article published in the July 24, 1990 edition of the Wall Street Journal, reporting on McDonald’s decision to switch to "100 percent vegetable oil," stated:

However, McDonald’s above-referenced 1990 press release and its continuing representations to the public that it was no longer going to use beef tallow in its cooking process were false and misleading because McDonald’s never stopped using beef tallow in the cooking of its french fries and hash browns.

McDonald’s July 1990 public relations announcement touting its use of "100 percent vegetable oil" was simply a ploy to obtain new customers became, at the time, McDonald’s was apparently suffering financial problems that had been attributed to its menu. Thus, for example, in an article published in the July 24, 1990 edition of the Chicago Sun-Times, it was noted:

McDonald’s decision to publicly and misleadingly disclaim its use of beef tallow in its french fries and hash browns coincided with not only greater public critique of its health benefits, but also with the 1990 "Dietary Guidelines for Americans," published by the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, which recommended that American diets should be low in saturated fat. This report noted that the fats in animal products are the main sources of saturated fats in most diets, and recommended a reduction in the consumption of such fats.

McDonald’s also issued its above-referenced July 1990 press release in order to attract vegetarians to its restaurants, and thereby gain additional revenue. McDonald’s was cognizant of this large vegetarian population.

Moreover, a 1991 Gallup Poll conducted for the National Restaurant Association concluded that about twenty percent (20%) of the population looked for restaurants with vegetarian items when they ate out, and that about one-third (1/3) of the public would order non-meat items if they were listed on the menu.

In light of McDonald’s poor public image with respect to its food, as well as its falling revenues, defendant’s clear motivation in the introduction of the new "healthy" fries was to attract a large number of vegetarians to its restaurants, as well as individuals who sought vegetarian items as an alternative to animal-derived items for consumption.

Defendant was also motivated to falsely represent to American consumers that its French fries were cooked in "100 percent vegetable oil" because two of its competitors, Burger King and Hardees, had announced their switch to vegetable oil. Thus, in order to prohibit revenue losses that might be attributable to consumers choosing these competitors because of healthier menu items, defendant chose to make similar representations in order to remain competitive in the "fast food" market.

In order to accomplish this goal, defendant intentionally failed to publicly disclose its continued used of beef tallow in the cooking process for french fries and hash browns under the guise of "natural flavor." At no time did defendant ever cease the use of beef tallow in the cooking process, notwithstanding McDonald’s public representations to the contrary. At no time between July 23, 1990 and May 21, 2001 has defendant ever disclosed in any advertising, press release, or public statement that it has continued the use of beef tallow in the french fries and hash browns cooking process.

To the contrary, defendant continued to publicly represent that it only used vegetable oil in the preparation of french fries. For example, on the "Nutritionist FAQ" located at McDonald’s Internet website (www.mcdonalds.com/food/nutritionist.html) there was the following representation:

The same ingredients were set forth in McDonald’s "Ingredient/Product Listing For People With Allergies/Food Sensitivities." There was no notation that beef tallow is included in any of the delineation of the ingredients of defendant’s french fries and hash browns.

Defendant failed to disclose that the true source of "natural flavors" is beef tallow. A reasonable person would reasonably conclude that the term "natural flavor" as applied to a potato product to mean flavors natural to the potatoes or vegetable oils in which the product is cooked.

The "natural flavor" in McDonald’s ingredients consists primarily, if not exclusively, of beef tallow. McDonald’s does not identify the amount of beef tallow used in its ingredient list became it is considered a "secret ingredient" that is the source of the flavor of McDonald’s french fries and hash browns, of which it was been historically proud.

Defendant did not discontinue the use of beef tallow in the french fries and hash browns cooking process because it did not want to lose or change the distinctive flavor of the french fries and has browns. Defendant did not disclose the continued use of beef tallow because it did not want to lose its vegetarian customers.

The fact that defendant was selling french fries and hash browns which contain beef was a material fact, which defendant should have disclosed.

Plaintiffs would never have purchased or consumed the french fries or hash browns if they had known they contain beef.

McDonald’s Corporation promulgated from corporate headquarters in Oak Brook a brochure (Exhibit A) that stated, "To address questions about the ingredients in our food, following is a complete listing which details all of our menu items, from a Big Mac@ [sic] sandwich to a small order of fries." Under "french fries," nothing was said about meat or beef. On information and belief, McDonald’s intended the reference to "natural flavor" to encompass beef extract. If so, its statements were affirmatively misleading, since "natural flavor" when used with reference to a potato product implies potato flavor, not meat flavor.

The brochure applied to both company-owned and franchised restaurants. It concluded, "All products served at McDonald’s – and provided by our suppliers – must meet our strict specifications and high standards of quality."

Defendant suppressed and concealed the fact that its french fries and hash browns contain beef.

Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines "vegetarianism" as "the theory or practice of living on a diet made up of vegetables, fruits, grains, nuts and sometimes animal products (as milk and cheese)." The American Dietetic Association recognized the validity of vegetarian diets in its 1997 publication entitled "Position of the American Dietetic

Association: Vegetarian Diets," and noted that:

Defendant intentionally marketed its french fries and hash browns to the vegetarian community, knowing full well that its fries are not vegetarian. (As alleged herein, there are approximately fifteen million vegetarians who reside in the United States.) McDonald’s Corporation markets and sells a vegetarian hamburger called the "McVeggie," in limited areas of the State of California. This "McVeggie" is advertised as being vegetarian. McDonald’s Corporation packages the "McVeggie" in "value meals" in which it combines the "McVeggie" with the non-vegetarian french fries and a soft drink at a "value" price. McDonald’s Corporation markets these "McVeggie value meals," knowing that they are not vegetarian because the fries are cooked in beef tallow, in an attempt to mislead consumers to purchase its products and thereby reap greater profits.

Hindus regard the cow as sacred and would never knowingly consume beef or beef products. Among many Hindus, the thought of consuming beef is so offensive and outrageous that starvation would be preferable. For most Hindus, eating beef is great sin and a majority of Hindus are vegetarians.

Plaintiffs have all purchased and eaten McDonald’s french fries believing and having been led to believe that such french fries were vegetarian. Plaintiffs were explicitly informed that McDonald’s french fries are vegetarian and relied upon such representations to their detriment. But for the fact that McDonald’s has advertised its french fries as being cooked only "100 percent vegetable oil" and being explicitly informed that the french fries were vegetarian, plaintiffs would not have consumed such fries.

Vegetarians (such as plaintiffs) who do not eat animal products (such as beef tallow) for ethical, moral, health and religious reasons would not purchase McDonald’s fries if they knew they contained beef tallow. Members of various religious groups who abstain from eating meat products or promote vegetarianism would also not eat McDonald’s french fries and hash browns if they knew they contained beef tallow. Allergy sufferers, who may be allergic to beef or animal products, would not buy McDonald’s french fries and hash browns if they knew that they contained beef tallow.

By and through defendant’s false and misleading representations, plaintiffs have suffered damages including, but not limited to, emotional distress caused by the fact they were misled into purchasing and ingesting food that contained beef tallow. Defendant, by and through its knowingly fraudulent advertising campaign, as well as the continued disinformation distributed in McDonald’s Internet website and through its agents, deliberately and willfully caused such harm, all in an attempt to enrich itself.

McDonald’s suppressed and concealed the fact that its french fries and hash browns contain beef until, on May 24, 2001, McDonald’s admitted the truth about its french fries and hash browns in a statement found on the Company’s U.S. web site. McDonald’s stated:

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of all persons resident in the United States (including the District of Columbia and territories and possessions), including but not limited to vegetarians and Hindus, who (i) have consumed food products from or at McDonald’s Restaurants since July 23, 1990 and (ii) have concerns, objections, or dietary restrictions, whether ethical, moral, religious, philosophical, or health-related, with respect to the consumption of beef or meat.

The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are an estimated 1 million Hindus and 15 million vegetarians in the U.S., who would refrain from consuming McDonald’s french fries and hash browns for ethical or moral reasons if they knew that the product contained beef or meat. There are approximately 7 million Jews and other persons in the United States who consume kosher meat products.

There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. These questions include:

Whether defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of selling french fries and hash browns which contain beef.

Whether defendant suppressed and concealed the material fact that it was selling french fries and hash browns that contain beef.

Whether defendant advertised and sold french fries and hash browns to plaintiffs and the members of the class using false and/or misleading statements or representations.

Whether defendant thereby engaged in consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices, or other unlawful acts.

Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the members of the class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in the prosecution of class actions and consumer fraud claims.

A class action is appropriate for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that:

Defendant has inflicted similar injuries to a large number of persons through a single course of conduct;

Individual actions are not economical.

VIOLATION ALLEGED -- CONSUMER FRAUD

Defendant engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices, in violation of the consumer fraud statutes of each state, by selling french fries and hash browns without disclosure of the material fact that they contained beef tallow or beef extract. Plaintiffs’ claim is brought on behalf of:

all residents of the state of Alabama, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of Alabama’s general statutory fraud statutes (Ala. Code §6-5-101 et seq.) and the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Ala. Code §8-19-1 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Alaska, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (Alaska Stat. §45.50.471 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Arizona, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Statute (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §44-1521 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Arkansas, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Ark. Code Ann. §4-88-101 et seq.);

all residents of the state of California, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code §1750 et seq. (West)) and the Unfair Competition and False Advertising Statutes (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200, 17500) (West));

all residents of the state of Colorado, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (Colo. Rev. Stat. §6-1-101 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Connecticut, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. §42-110a et seq.);

all residents of the state of Delaware, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Consumer Fraud Act (De. Code Ann. Tit. 6, §2511 et seq.) and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, §2531 et seq.);

all residents of the state of the District of Columbia, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (D.C. Code Ann. §28-3901 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Florida, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Fla. Stat. Ann. §501.201 et seq. (West)) and the Florida False Advertising Statutes (Fla. Stat. Ann. §817.40 et seq. (West));

all residents of the state of Georgia, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Ga. Code Ann. §10-1-370 et seq.); the Fair Business Practices Act (Ga. Code Ann. §10-1-390 et seq.); and the False Advertising Statute (Ga. Code Ann. §10-1-420 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Hawaii, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Hawaii Federal Trade Commission Act (Hawaii Rev. Stat. §480 et seq.) and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice Act (Hawaii Rev. Stat. §481A et seq.);

all residents of the state of Idaho, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (Idaho Code §48-601 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Illinois, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. §505/1 et seq. (Smith Hurd)) and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 510/1 et seq. (Smith Hurd));

all residents of the state of Indiana, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (Ind. Code Ann. §24-5-0.5-1 et seq. (Burns));

all residents of the state of Iowa, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act (Iowa Code Ann. §714.16 (West));

all residents of the state of Kansas, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (Kan. Stat. Ann. §50-623 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Kentucky, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act (Ky. Rev. Stat. §367.110 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Louisiana, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §51:1401 (West));

all residents of the state of Maine, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 5 §206 et seq.) and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 10 §1211 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Maryland, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (Md. Com. Law Code Ann. §§13-101 et seq., 14-101 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Massachusetts, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 93A);

all residents of the state of Michigan, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §445.901 et seq.) and the Michigan Pricing and Advertising Act (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §445.351 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Minnesota, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Consumer Fraud Act (Minn. Stat. Ann. §325 F. 69); the False Statement in Advertisement Statute (Minn. Stat. Ann. §325 F. 67); the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Minn. Stat. Ann. §325D.44); and the Unlawful Trade Practices Act (Minn. Stat. Ann. §325D.13);

all residents of the state of Mississippi, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act (Miss. Code Ann. §75-24-1 et seq.) and the False Advertising Statutes (Miss. Code Ann. §97-23-3);

all residents of the state of Missouri, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (Mo. Rev. Stat. §407.010 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Montana, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (Mont. Code Ann. §30-14-101 et seq.); and the Statutory Deceit Statute (Mont. Code Ann. §27-1-712);

all residents of the state of Nebraska, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act (Neb. Rev. Stat. §59-1601 et seq.) and the Nebraska Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Neb. Rev. Stat. §87-301 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Nevada, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Deceptive Trade Statutes (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§598.0903 et seq., 41.600 et seq.);

all residents of the state of New Hampshire, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Regulation of Business Practices for Consumer Protection Act (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §358-A:1 et seq.);

all residents of the state of New Jersey, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (N.J. Stat. Ann. §56:8-1 et seq. (West));

all residents of the state of New Mexico, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act (N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-12-1 et seq.);

all residents of the state of New York, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the New York Consumer Protection Act (N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§349, 350 (Consol.));

all residents of the state of North Carolina, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (N.C. Gen. Stat. §75-1.1 et seq.);

all residents of the state of North Dakota, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Deceptive Act or Practice Statutes (N.D. Gen. Stat. §51-15-01 et. seq.);

all residents of the state of Ohio, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1345.01 et seq. (Baldwin));

all residents of the state of Oklahoma, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act (Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 15, §751 et seq. (West)) and the Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 78, §51 et seq. (West));

all residents of the state of Oregon, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Unlawful Trade Practices Act (Or. Rev. Stat. §646.605 et seq.) and the Oregon Food and Other Commodities Act (Or. Rev. Stat. §616.005 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Pennsylvania, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices Act and Consumer Protection Law (Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 73 §201-1 et seq. (Purdon);

all residents of the state of Rhode Island, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act (R.I. Gen. Law §6-13.1-1 et seq.);

all residents of the state of South Carolina, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (S.C. Code Ann. §39-5-10 et seq.);

all residents of the state of South Dakota, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the South Dakota Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §37-24-1 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Tennessee, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (Tenn. Code Ann. §47-18-101 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Texas, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §17.41 et seq. (Vernon));

all residents of the state of Utah, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (Utah Code Ann. §13-11-1 et seq.) and the Utah Truth in Advertising Act (Utah Code Ann. §13-11a-1 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Vermont, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Vermont Consumer Fraud Statute (Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 9, §2451 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Virginia, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (Va. Code 59.1-196 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Washington, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §19.86 et seq.);

all residents of the state of West Virginia, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (W. Va. Code §46A-6-101 et seq.);

all residents of the state of Wisconsin, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Wisconsin Fraudulent Representations Act (Wis. Stat. Ann. §100.18 et seq. (West));

all residents of the state of Wyoming, and all other persons resident in other states, who are addressed by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act (Wyo. Stat. §40-12-101 et seq.);

all residents of the above states and the District of Columbia and all territories and possessions of the United States who have common law or statutory claims arising out of the facts alleged herein.

Defendant engaged in such conduct in the course of trade and commerce.

The marketing and advertising decisions that resulted in the deceptive sale of french fries and hash browns took place at McDonald’s corporate headquarters in Oak Brook, Illinois.

Defendant intended that plaintiffs and the class members rely on and be affected by its acts and practices.

As a proximate result of defendant’s wrongful conduct, plaintiffs and the class members have sustained damages.

Defendant’s conduct was intentionally fraudulent, warranting substantial punitive damages.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs and the class and against defendant for:

Actual and punitive damages;

An injunction restraining future nondisclosures;

Restitution, disgorgement, and other equitable monetary relief;

Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit;

Such other or further relief as is appropriate.

_______________________

James O. Latturner

Daniel A. Edelman

Cathleen M. Combs

James O. Latturner

Tara L. Goodwin

Jason G. Shanfield

EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER, & GOODWIN, LLC

120 S. LaSalle Street, 18th floor

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 739-4200

(312) 419-0379 (FAX)

Atty. No. 12775

Kevin P. Roddy

HAGENS BERMAN LLP

611 West Sixth Street, 16th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90017-3101

(213) 861-7454

(213) 330-7152 (FAX)

Steve W. Berman

HAGENS BERMAN LLP

1301 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900

Seattle, WA 98101

(206) 623-7292

(206) 623-0594 (FAX)

Michael A. Caddell

Cynthia Chapman

Corey Fein

CADDELL & CHAPMAN

1331 Lamar, Suite 1070

Houston, TX 77010-3027

(713) 751-0400

(713) 751-0906 (FAX)

Sherrie R. Savett

Michael T. Fantini

BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.

1622 Locust St.

Philadelphia, PA 19103

(215) 875-3000

(215) 875-4636 (FAX)

Harish Bharti

309 West Republican

Seattle, WA 98119

(206) 282-5630

(206) 281-9032 (FAX)

Richard W. Espey

Ricardo G. Cedillo

DAVIS, CEDILLO & MENDOZA, INC.

Suite 400, Harte-Hanks Tower

7710 Jones Maltsberger

San Antonio, TX 78216-6950

(210)822-6666

(210) 822-1151 (FAX)

Arvind Mahendru

Ashish Mahendru

THE LAW OFFICE OF ARVIND MAHENDRU

4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 115

Houston, TX 77027

(713) 626-5111

(713) 626-1975 (FAX)

Peter L. Masnik

KALIKMAN & MASNIK

30 Washington Avenue

Haddonfield, NJ 08033

(856) 428-5222

(856) 354-8086 (FAX)

Winston J. Block

BLOCK & BLOCK, P.C.

19 W. Jefferson, St.

Joliet, Illinois 60432

(815) 727-6311

(815) 727-6378 (FAX)