News & Resources

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-3487

CHAD SCHLOSSER and FRANCES SCHLOSSER

Plaintiffs-Appellant,

v.

FAIRBANKS CAPITAL CORP.

Defendants-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois, Urbana Division

The Honorable Michael P. McCuskey

2:01cv02121

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

CHAD SCHLOSSER and FRANCES SCHLOSSER

Daniel A. Edelman

Cathleen M. Combs

James O. Latturner

Adela C. Lucchesi

EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER, & GOODWIN, LLC

120 South LaSalle Street, 18th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 739-4200

(312) 419-0379 (FAX)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii-iii

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. FAIRBANKS’ CONSTRUCTION OF THE FDCPA IS INCORRECT . . . . . . . . 1

II. THE CASES FAIRBANKS RELIES UPON DO

NOT IN FACT SUPPORT ITS POSITION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

III FAIRBANKS’ ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH THE

DECISIONS RELIED ON BY PLAINTIFFS IS INACCURATE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

TYPE VOLUME CERTIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bailey v. Security National Servicing Corp., 154 F.3d 384 (7th Circ. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Barber v. National Bank of Alaska, 815 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 155 (2nd Circ. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987 (7th Circ. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Coppola v. Connecticut Student Loan foundation, Civ. A. 87-398, 1989

WL 47419 (D.Conn., March 22, 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Edler v. Student Loan Marketing Ass’n, No. 92-1619 (HHG), 1993 WL 625570 (DDC) . . . . . . . . 6

Farber v. NP Funding II, LP, 96 Civ. 4322, 1997 WL 913335, 1997

U.S.Dist. LEXIS 21245 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 110 (1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Fischer v. Unipac Service Corp., 519 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Iowa 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1935) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Franceschi v. Mautner-Glick Corp., 22 F.Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Jones v. Intuition, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 775, 779 (W.D.Tenn. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Johnson v. Statewide Collections, 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo. Sup Ct. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,7

Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F.Supp. 1480 (M. D.Ala. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484-85 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, and Clark, L.L.C.,

214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197 (5th Circ. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 & n.29 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Ruble v. Madison Capital, Inc., 1998 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 4926 (N.D. Ohio 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Salgado v. Harvard Collection Services, Inc., 01 C 2572, 2001 WL 803683 (N.D.Ill) . . . . . . . . . 6,7

Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103 (6th Circ. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Weinberg v. Arcventures, Inc., 96 C 556, 1996 WL 385951 (N.D.Ill) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,7

ii

United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37-38 & n.9 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Villarreal v. Snow, 95 C 2484, 1996 WL 28308 (N.D.Ill) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,7

Statues

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

15 U.S.C.§ § 1692g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

House Report 95-131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

iii

1

ARGUMENT

I. FAIRBANKS’ CONSTRUCTION OF THE FDCPA IS INCORRECT

Fairbanks’ argument on appeal consists of the following assertions:

1. Fairbanks contends that informing plaintiffs that in order to contest the existence

of a default they have to file a lawsuit against the lender, instead of merely writing a letter, is a minor

noncompliance with "the technical notice requirements of § 1692g of the FDCPA." (Def.Br., p. 2) Instead

of informing the Schlossers that they could dispute their alleged default status by letter, in which case

Fairbanks would be required to undertake to verify that they really were in default and cease collection

activities until that was done, the letter said "You have the right to bring a court action if you claim that the

loan is not in default." This (i) shifts the burden of determining the status of the debt from the collector to

the consumer and (ii) imposes a much more severe burden on the consumer (filing a court action as

opposed to writing a letter) than § 1692g contemplates.

2. Fairbanks’ initial demand letter "advised them [plaintiffs] of the amount due"

(Def.Br., p. 1). In fact, the August 22, 2000 letter did not state the amount of the debt as required by 15

U.S.C. §1692g. The dollar amount referred to, $1,173.64, is not the total amount owed by plaintiffs in

August 2000. The August 22, 2000 letter does not comply with Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick,

Cobb, Nichols, and Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000), although it was sent ten weeks after

Miller was decided (the date of the Miller decision is June 5, 2000).

3. Fairbanks claims that the "Schlossers seek nothing short of a judicial rewrite of the

FDCPA" (Def.Br., p. 4) when they suggest that defined terms in the FDCPA be given their defined

meanings whenever they appear. In fact, it is Fairbanks that seeks to rewrite the FDCPA, by having courts

interpret provisions containing statutorily-defined terms without using the definitions. Significantly,

Fairbanks does not cite a single case suggesting that a court can excise or ignore statutory definitions. On

the contrary, the definitions control the use of the defined terms whenever they appear. Benjamin v.

Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc). "It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the

term excludes unstated meanings of that term." Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484-85 (1987). "In such

2

circumstances definition by the average man or even by the ordinary dictionary with its studied enumeration

of subtle shades of meaning is not a substitute for the definition set before us by the lawmakers with

instructions to apply it to the exclusion of all others." Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1935)

(Cardozo, J.). "[W]e are bound to give effect to its definition of that term, for it would be idle for Congress

to define the sense in which it used it if we were free in despite of it to choose a meaning for ourselves."

Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 110 (1960).

4. Fairbanks claims that the Schlossers seek to have the debt collector’s liability turn

on its "subjective belief " as to whether the debt is in default at the time the collector acquired it. This is

untrue. The collector’s liability turns on whether it asserted that plaintiffs were delinquent debtors at the

time it acquired their loan. Where, as here, the first thing that Fairbanks does after acquiring the debt is to

send a demand letter captioned "DEMAND LETTER - YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME! " and

stating that "This letter constitutes formal notice of default under the terms of the Note and Deed of Trust

or Mortgage because of failure to make payments required," Fairbanks’ words and actions show that it

is treating the debt as having been in default at the time of acquisition. Reliance on the manifested intent of

the collector is consistent with this Court’s decision in Bailey v. Security National Servicing Corp., 154

F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 1998), where the Court considered determinative the fact that defendants "were not

demanding payment on a defaulted loan, but rather were servicing a current payment plan, or forbearance

agreement, executed between the Baileys and the Department of Housing and Urban Development." 154

F.3d at 385-86.

Based on these misstatements, Fairbanks seek to have this Court construe the FDCPA to

exclude from its protection the one group most in need of its protections – persons who are wrongly

accused of being delinquent debtors – even though:

1. The legislative history expressly states that such persons were intended to be

protected:

This bill also protects people who do not owe money at all. In the collector’s zeal,

collection effort are often aimed at the wrong person either because of mistaken identity

or mistaken facts. This bill will make collectors behave responsibly towards people with

3

whom they deal . . . .

House Report 95-131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8. Accord, Senate Report No. 95-382, p. 4, reprinted

at 1997 USCCAN 1695, 1699.

2. That Congressional intent was effectuated through the references to "alleged" and

"asserted " in the statutory definitions of "debt," "consumer " and "debt collector." 15 U.S.C. §§1692a(3),

(5), (6).

3. Many substantive provisions of the FDCPA are meaningless unless the FDCPA

applies to situations where consumers were wrongfully accused of being delinquent debtors. These include

the provision violated in the present case, §1692g.

The only justification Fairbanks advances for not using the statutory definition of "debt "

wherever it appears in §1692a(6)(F) is that the provision already refers to "asserted to be owed or due

another," from which Fairbanks divines a "plain meaning" that the basic definition of "debt " not apply.

The short answer is that in an obvious effort to insure coverage of efforts to collect obligations which were

assertedly but not actually due Congress included a substantial amount of repetitiveness in the statutory

definitions – §1692a(5) defines a "debt " as "any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay

money," §1692a(6) defines "debt collector " as one who "regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly

or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another," and §1692a(3) defines

"consumer " as "any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt."

The fact that there is a further repetition of the concept of "asserted " debt in the

introductory phrase of § 1692a(6)(F) hardly makes it "plain" that the statutory definition is not be used.

Congress established a basic definition of "debt " that includes alleged obligations that are not in fact owed.

That Congress repeated the concept of "alleged" or "asserted " obligations in several more places in the

FDCPA does not give rise to an inference, much less a "plain meaning," that in instances where the word

"debt " is used without repetition of the concept of "alleged " or "asserted," Congress meant to exclude

alleged obligations that are not in fact owed, thus rendering the statutory definition meaningless. The

repeated references to "asserted " and "alleged " obligations either (a) make it plain that persons who

4

obtain the right to collect what are asserted to be delinquent debts, but which are not in fact owed, are

covered, or (b) create an ambiguity, to be resolved by the clear statements in both the House and Senate

reports that § 1692g was indeed intended to protect persons who are wrongly dunned.

II. THE CASES FAIRBANKS RELIES UPON

DO NOT IN FACT SUPPORT ITS POSITION

Fairbanks then proceeds to misrepresent caselaw. Most egregious is its discussion of

Franceschi v. Mautner-Glick Corp., 22 F.Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), sometimes referred to as

Franchisi, and which Fairbanks claims is "squarely " in point (Def.Br., p. 8). The debt in Franceschi was

rent, and the defendant the management company that operated the building, signed leases with tenants,

and collected all rents from the inception of a lease. Because defendant had the right to collect rents as

soon as a lease was signed, i.e., before rents were due, much less past due, the court held that the

§1692a(6)(F)(iii) exception applied and that the management company was not a debt collector. See 22

F.Supp.2d at 254 (exception applies "to those who had responsibility prior to default for collecting the debt

owed to another.") The court then rejected the plaintiff’s contentions that (1) §1692a(6)(F)(iii) does not

apply to one who acquires the right to collect a debt but not its beneficial ownership and (2) the exception

was inapplicable in situations where the debt was asserted to be owed but was not in fact due, because "the

provision applies to collectors of alleged as well as real debt." Far from supporting Fairbanks’ position,

this last point in Franceschi supports Mr. and Mrs. Schlosser – at the time Fairbanks first became involved

with them they had an alleged delinquency, but not a real one.

Fairbanks also misrepresents this Court’s decision in Whitaker v. Ameritech Corp., 129

F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 1991). The supposed "debt collector" in Whitaker was the local telephone utility, which

is legally obligated to bill for long distance services provided by unrelated companies. Whitaker is not in

point at all, for it is clear that at the time the telephone customer is first billed for the long distance services,

no payment is yet due for them, much less overdue. The local telephone company is simply collecting a

current debt which is neither actually nor allegedly delinquent. "While Ameritech does collect money owed

to long distance companies and information providers, it does not acquire those debts after they are in

5

default. It acquires those debts, according to contracts with the long distance and information providers,

at the moment each telephone call is placed. [citation]. Indeed, Ameritech acquires the debts even before

the consumer receives a bill. If the customer does default on the debt, the default occurs after Ameritech

acquires the debt, not before." 129 F.3d at 958-59. The case does not address the situation where, at the

time a defendant first becomes involved with a debt, the defendant alleges it is delinquent, but the allegation

is false.

Defendant then claims that Coppola v. Connecticut Student Loan foundation, Civ. A. 87-

398, 1989 WL 47419 (D.Conn., March 22, 1989), "specifically addressed" the "very issue of whether

a servicer who mistakenly believes a loan to be in default – when in reality it is not – falls within the

meaning of a ‘debt collector’ " (Def.Br., pp. 11-12). The debt in Coppola was a student loan on which

"monthly payments first became due on June 1, 1986." Defendant became involved with the debt "under

a student loan servicing contract with NELLIE MAE entered into on August 15, 1986." The problem that

gave rise to the lawsuit was that "an incorrect computer entry indicated that plaintiff had failed to make two

loan payments (in November and December of 1986)." Quite clearly, if defendant’s involvement with the

debt began on August 15, 1986 and the asserted delinquency concerned the November and December

1986 payments, the debt was neither actually nor assertedly in default on August 15, 1986, and the case

could not address the question of whether the defendant would have been covered by the FDCPA if the

debt had been assertedly in default on August 15, 1986, but the assertion was untrue.

Defendant then string cites cases stating the general rule that one who acquires or becomes

involved with debts before they become delinquent is not a debt collector, but presenting no issue

concerning a debt that was allegedly but not actually in default at the time of acquisition. Wadlington v.

Credit Acceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103 (6th Cir. 1996) (auto finance company that takes assignments of

motor vehicle retail installment contracts from dealers promptly after execution is not a debt collector; such

a contract is neither actually nor assertedly in default when the assignee gets it; the assignee’s collection

lawyers who become involved with the contracts after the consumer is delinquent are debt collectors);

Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1985) (mortgage company which originated loan and

6

sold it while retaining servicing is not a debt collector – clearly the loan was neither actually nor assertedly

in default immediately upon execution – nor is purchaser that acquired loan 2 months before alleged act

of default); Barber v. National Bank of Alaska, 815 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1991) (employee of bank which

originates mortgage loan and sells it while retaining servicing is not a debt collector); Fischer v. Unipac

Service Corp., 519 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Iowa 1994) (loan servicing company that began servicing loan in

1985 and declared plaintiff in default in 1989 is not a debt collector); Edler v. Student Loan Marketing

Ass’n, No. 92-1619 (HHG), 1993 WL 625570 (D.D.C.) (similar); Jones v. Intuition, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d

775, 779 (W.D.Tenn. 1998) (similar). Cases are not authority for questions which are neither presented

nor addressed. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 & n.29 (1984);

United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37-38 & n.9 (1952); Brown v. Payday

Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2000).

III. FAIRBANKS’ ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH THE

DECISIONS RELIED ON BY PLAINTIFFS IS INACCURATE.

Fairbanks also attempts to distinguish the decisions cited by plaintiffs – Weinberg v.

Arcventures, Inc. 96 C 556, 1996 WL 385951 (N.D. Ill.); Salgado v. Harvard Collection Services, Inc.,

01 C 2572, 2001 WL 803683 (N.D.Ill.); Villarreal v. Snow, 95 C 2484, 1996 WL 28308 (N.D.Ill.); and

Johnson v. Statewide Collections, 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1989) -- on the ground that in each the

defendant was clearly a debt collector. The attempted distinction fails, because Fairbanks’ contention here

is not that it never is a debt collector, but that "Fairbanks was not a ‘debt collector’ subject to the Act as

to the Schlossers’ loan " (Def.Br., p. 2). Fairbanks does not suggest that when it acquires a block of

12,800 supposedly delinquent mortgages as part of a business involving the repeated acquisition of

delinquent mortgages, it is not a "debt collector " as to the loans (presumably the majority) which actually

are delinquent. It is well established that scavengers that regularly purchase bad debts as part of their usual

business activities are covered by the FDCPA. Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F.Supp. 1480

(M.D.Ala. 1987). Ruble v. Madison Capital, Inc., 1998 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 4926 (N.D.Ohio 1998); Farber

v. NP Funding II, LP, 96 Civ. 4322, 1997 WL 913335, 1997 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 21245 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

7

(Fairbanks has a Web site, www.fairbankscapital.com, on which it describes itself as a "residential

mortgage servicing company specializing in the underperforming mortgage market," states that it got started

by purchasing "distressed assets" from the RTC and FDIC for its own account, and claims "expertise in

the effective management and resolution of sub-performing mortgage loans". See Appendix A hereto.

"Underperforming" and "sub-performing" loans and "distressed assets" are euphemisms for delinquent

debts subject to the FDCPA. Plaintiffs allege and will prove that Fairbanks has acquired the right to collect

large numbers of allegedly delinquent residential mortgages on multiple occasions and as part of its regular

business activities.)

The same argument that the defendant is not a debt collector with respect to specific debts

can be made where the defendant (1) dunned the wrong person, as in Weinberg v. Arcventures, Inc., 96

C 556, 1996 WL 385951 (N.D. Ill.); (2) dunned the right person, but the debt was paid or is current or

was never owed, as in Salgado v. Harvard Collection Services, Inc., 01 C 2572, 2001 WL 803683

(N.D.Ill.); and Villarreal v. Snow, 95 C 2484, 1996 WL 28308 (N.D.Ill.); or (3) dunned the correct

person for an unpaid debt, but the consumer had a valid reason for not paying, as in Johnson v. Statewide

Collections, 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1989). In each case, the putative debt collector could or did

argue that, at least with respect to the target of its collection efforts, it was collecting "a debt which was not

in default at the time it was obtained by such person," and therefore was not a "debt collector" with respect

to that target.

Judge Lindberg in Villareal thought it "absurd " not to apply the protections of the FDCPA

in such instances, relying on the use of "alleged " and "asserted" in the statutory definitions. Plaintiffs agree.

Indeed, making the applicability of the FDCPA turn on whether a debt was actually in default is

unworkable – in many cases, there will be disputes as to what the consumer’s obligation was,whether

payments were received, whether the payments were correctly applied, etc. Determining whether the

underlying debt was actually in default may require a jury trial on contract issues that have little or nothing

to do with the FDCPA violation. Furthermore, the FDCPA was meant to protect consumers who find

themselves in such disputes against abusive collection practices, and depriving the consumer of its

8

protection because he denies being in default makes no sense.

The Court should hold that if a defendant (i) regularly collects delinquent debts as part of

its usual business activities; and (ii) claims that a consumer owed a debt that was delinquent at the time

defendant became involved with it, the FDCPA applies, even if the claim proves to be unfounded, and

regardless of the precise reason the person dunned did not owe the money. No inquiry into the subjective

beliefs of the defendant is required, the test rather being whether its words and acts show it is attempting

to collect a debt that was delinquent when the defendant acquired it.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in our initial brief, this Court should hold that Fairbanks

is a "debt collector " subject to the FDCPA with respect to consumer credit obligations that it claims are

delinquent when acquired, even if the consumer disputes the alleged delinquency. The Court should

accordingly reverse the judgment appealed from and remand the case for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________

Daniel A. Edelman

Daniel A. Edelman

Cathleen M. Combs

James O. Latturner

Adela C. Lucchesi

EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER, & GOODWIN, LLC

120 S. LaSalle Street, 18th floor

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 739-4200

(312) 419-0379 (FAX)

9

TYPE VOLUME CERTIFICATION

In accordance with Seventh Circuit Rule 32(d)(3), I hereby certify that this brief meets the

type volume limitation of Seventh Circuit Rule 32(d)(2)(A), in that it contains 2,997 words according to

the word count feature of Corel Word Perfect Suite 8, the program used to produce it.

___________________

Daniel A. Edelman

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Daniel A. Edelman, hereby certify that three (3) true and accurate copies of the foregoing

document and a disk were sent Via United States Mail on January 14, 2002 to:

Terrance E. Kiwala

ROOKS, PITTS, POUST

10 South Wacker Drive, Suite 2300

Chicago, Illinois 60606

Michael P. Turiello

ROOKS, PITTS, POUST

111 North Ottawa Street, PO Box 943

Joliet, Illinois 60432

Cynthia Gilman

Mitchel H. Kider

Cynthia G. Swan

WEINER, BRODSKY, SIDMAN AND KIDER

1300 19th Street NW 5th Floor

Washington DC 20036

___________________

Daniel A. Edelman

11

APPENDIX

Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A1-A3